Traditional hash functions are designed to protect even a slightest modification in a message. Thus, one bit changed in a message would result in a totally different message digest when a hash function is applied. This feature is not suitable for applications whose message spaces admit some certain fuzziness such as multimedia communications or biometric authentication applications. In these applications, approximate hash functions must be designed so that the distance between messages are proportionally reflected in the distance between message digests. Most of the previous designs of approximate hash functions employs traditional hash functions. In an ingenious approximate message authentication scheme for N -ary alphabet recently proposed by Ge, Arce and Crescenzo, the approximate hash functions are based on the majority selection function. This scheme is suitable for N -ary messages with arbitrary alphabet size N . In this paper, we show a hidden property of the majority selection function, which allows us to successfully break this scheme. We show that an adversary by observing just one message and digest pair, without any knowledge of the secret information, can generate N − 1 new valid message and digest pairs. In order to resist against the attack, we propose some modifications to the original design. The corrected scheme is as efficient as the original scheme and it is secure against the attack. By a new combinatorial approach, we calculate explicitly the security parameters of the corrected scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Message authentication codes have been used to ensure authenticity of the communicated messages. To send a message, the sender uses a secret key to generate a tag for the message. The sender then sends the pair, message and tag, to the receiver. The secret key has been agreed before hand by the sender and the receiver. So when the receiver receives a message and a tag, the receiver uses the shared secret key to check if the tag is matched with the message or not. If it matches then the receiver believes that the message is indeed authentic.
Generally, to generate a tag for a message, the receiver applies a keyed hash function to the message. The tag is the output value of the hash function and it is also called the message digest. The hash function is designed so that a single change in the message will result in a big change in the digest. So during the communication, even a single error occurs, the receiver will be notified by the digest checking. This, however, is not desirable in some applications where the nature of the message is fuzzy, for example, voice, image or biometric data. In many multimedia applications, small changes due to format conversion or watermarking are acceptable. In biometric applications, readings of the same subject are likely to change over time. These changes are considered insignificant and the readings are considered the same. To cope with this fuzzy nature of the message space, a new authentication method called approximate message authentication has been introduced.
In approximate message authentication codes, the message space is equipped with a distance function which measures the difference between two messages. Two messages are viewed the same or indistinguishable if their distance is below some threshold parameter. In this case, a message is considered as an acceptable version of the other message by the application. The keyed hash function need to be designed so that the amount of differences in the messages will be proportionally reflected in the digests. That is, for any secret key that is used, if two messages have minor difference then their corresponding digests should have minor difference. Similarly, if the two messages have major difference then their digests should look differently. In this case, if the sender sends a message m together with its digest t = Tag k (m), then upon receiving a slightly modified message m with the tag t, the receiver can calculate the tag t = Tag k (m ) and check if t and t are slightly different or not. If they are then the receiver believes that the message is authentic from the sender, otherwise, if the two tags are totally different then the receiver rejects the message.
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Most of the previous designs of approximate hash functions employs traditional hash functions and can be classified into two groups. The main method used in the first group is to extract some feature data from the original message and then applying a traditional hash function on this feature data. In the second group, the message is first modified by some quantization functions to tolerate some predictable distortions and then the modified message is hashed by some standard cryptographic hash function. When the message is an image or a video, the feature can be the block-based intensity histograms [13] , [4] , [6] , the average gray values [8] , the image-edge information [12] , the discrete cosine transform coefficients [7] , [11] , [2] , the wavelet coefficients [1] , [9] , or Fourier transform coefficients [14] . When the message is treated as a binary string, as it suggested in [3] , the message can be permuted and then some random substrings are selected as the feature data. Each random substring is hashed by some universal one-way hash function and the digest of the original message is the concatenation of all the digests of the substrings. The quantization technique proposed in [15] is to scale the block-based two-dimensional discrete cosine transform coefficients by dividing them by some standard scaling values. In [10] , it uses a uniform quantization function with step size equal to 2v + 1 in order to tolerate ±v distortion in each pixel.
In this paper, we consider an ingenious approximate message authentication scheme for N -ary alphabets recently proposed by Ge, Arce and Crescenzo [5] . We call this scheme GAC scheme. This scheme is quite different from other previous scheme that it does not use traditional hash function in the design of the approximate hash function. Instead, it uses the majority function. The majority function takes as input a list of N -ary symbols and returns the symbol that appears most frequently in the input list. This is a natural choice for designing a noise tolerance hash function. In this scheme, a message is a string of N -ary alphabets. When N = 2, this scheme is the same as the scheme proposed in [16] . The motivation of considering a message as an N -ary string instead of a binary string comes from the fact that some information such as graphics, multilevel and color halftones, biological DNA or protein sequences do not naturally represented as binary. The difference between these messages are also better measured as in N -ary domain.
In the GAC scheme, the approximate keyed hash function is composed of five phases: padding, re-formatting, permutation, randomization and majority selection. A message is first zero padded so that its length becomes a multiple of L where L is the size of the digest. After zero padding, the padded message pad L (m) is formatted into a matrix with L columns. Then a random permutation is applied so that it will spread out randomly the changes in the message. Next, to destroy all interdependence between the message components, the matrix is added with a random matrix. The permutation and the random matrix are generated by the secret key. Finally, the majority function is applied to each column of the matrix. At each column, the symbol that appears most frequently is selected to become a component of the message digest. So with L columns, we have a digest of size L.
The final phase is the most crucial part of the design. It uses the majority selection function. The majority selection function is clearly a distance preserving function. If we have a small change in the input then it is likely that its output will not change much. However, the majority selection function has a hidden property and in this paper, we use this property to break the scheme.
The hidden property of the majority selection function, majority, is that it is shift-invariant. That is, if S is a list of N -ary symbols (treated as elements of Z N ), and S ⊕ c is obtained from S by adding every symbols of S by a constant c (modulo N ), then majority(S ⊕ c) = majority(S) ⊕ c.
Our attack is called the shifting attack. We show that if the adversary has just a single pair (m, t) where t = Tag k (m) then by choosing an arbitrary constant c ∈ Z N and set m = pad L (m) ⊕ c and t = t ⊕ c 1 , the new pair (m , t ) is a valid pair. Thus, with a single valid pair, the adversary can produce N − 1 other valid pairs. With this attack, the adversary does not need to know any secret key or any information about the random permutation or random matrix used in the hash function.
To fix this scheme, we modify the padding phase and the randomization phase. In the padding phase, similar to SHA-1, we require that every message must be zero-padded with its length value. In the randomization phase of the current design, a component of the matrix is modified by adding a random number. What we propose is, we multiply the component with a random number then adding the result with another random number. The purpose of this extra multiplication is to destroy the shift-invariant property. It is an easy exercise for the reader to verify that the modification to the padding phase alone does not defeat the shifting attack. Thus, the modification to the randomization phase is crucially important.
It is pointed out in [5] that the calculation of the probability of majority change is useful for the security analysis of the scheme. For an input list of symbols, p N ( , n) denotes the probability of the event that the majority selection function changes the output if n of the symbols in the input list changes. This probability of majority change was formulated in [5] , but the proposed formula involves Markov Chain transition probability that makes it very difficult to have an explicit calculation. In this paper, we devise a new combinatorial approach to calculate this probability explicitly and thus giving an explicit formulation of the security parameters of the corrected scheme.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we gives definitions and notions of approximate hash functions and approximate message authentication schemes. Section III reviews the GAC scheme. We present our attack in section III-A. The corrected scheme is presented in section IV. In section V, we give explicit formulation of the probability of majority change. Security analysis is provided in section VI and section VII concludes the paper.
II. DEFINITIONS
In this section, we give formal definitions and discuss some important properties of approximate hash functions and their security parameters.
Let M denote a message space. Suppose that M is a (d, e in , e out )-sensitive message space. An approximate message authentication scheme defined on this space must specify two algorithms: tag generation algorithm and verification algorithm, with the following two properties. If the tag generation algorithm produces a digest (or tag) t on a message m then 1) the verification must accept (m , t) as a valid pair with high probability if d(m, m ) ≤ e in ; 2) the verification must reject (m , t) as an invalid pair with high probability if d(m, m ) ≥ e out . We have the following formal definition.
Definition 2: A (d, e in , e out ) approximate message authentication scheme is (p correct , p secure )-secure if it specifies a message space M, which is (d, e in , e out )-sensitive, a tag space T , a key space K and two algorithms Tag k : M → T and VF k : M × T → {0, 1}, each indexed by a key k ∈ K, that satisfy the following two properties:
) ≤ e in then we call it a false negative. On the other hand, if VF k (m , t) = 1 where d(m , m) ≥ e out then it is a false positive. An approximate message authentication scheme with parameters (p correct , p secure ) defined above ensures that false negative happens with probability less than 1 − p correct and false positive happens with probability less than 1 − p secure . In [5] , the first property in the Definition 2, is called the noise tolerance property.
Definition 3: [5] An approximate message authentication scheme is p-noise tolerance if
Another important property considered in [5] is the distance preserving property. It requires that from two messages of small distance apart, the tag generation algorithm must output two tags of small distance.
Definition 4: An approximate message authentication scheme is (e in , e T , p)-distance preserving if
where d T is a distance function on the tag space. If the verification algorithm VF k (m, t) is: calculate t = Tag k (m) and return 1 if d(t, t ) ≤ e T , then an approximate authentication scheme is p-noise tolerance if and only if it is (e in , e T , p)-distance preserving. Thus the two properties, noise tolerance and distance preserving, can be made equivalent.
III. THE GE-ARCE-CRESCENZO AMAC SCHEME
In this section we give a description of the Ge-Arce-Crescenzo AMAC scheme and present its weakness. This scheme is for N -ary messages. The alphabet set is assumed to be Z N = {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}. The operation ⊕ is the addition modulo N . The parameter L is the digest length.
There are five phases in the tag generation algorithm: padding, re-formatting, permutation, randomization and majority selection.
Tag generation algorithm Tag k (m): Given a secret key k and an N -ary message m
• Padding: if the length of m is not a multiple of L then pad 0 at the end of the message until its length becomes a multiple of L, the padded message is denoted by pad L (m); • Re-formatting: suppose the length of the padded message
• Permutation: use the secret key k to generate a permutation π for the R × L matrix (so that an entry in the matrix is permuted to a new entry). Apply this permutation π to the matrix (m ij ) to get a new matrix (q ij )
• Randomization: use the secret key k to generate for each 1 ≤ i ≤ R and 1 ≤ j ≤ L a random number r ij ∈ Z N and set q ij ⊕ r ij = z ij , we obtain a new matrix (z ij )
The majority selection function selects the symbol appears with the highest frequency in the input list. If a "tie" occurs, the function breaks the tie by comparing the adjacent value.
• Output: L symbols (t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t L ) forms the digest t for the message m.
A. Our attack
In this section, we present our shifting attack to the GAC scheme based on two crucial observations. We show that an adversary by observing just one message and digest pair, without any knowledge of the secret information, can generate N − 1 new valid message and digest pairs.
Notation. If we write m = (m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m ), then for a constant c ∈ Z N , we define m ⊕ c to be the following message
So m ⊕ c is obtained from m by adding every symbols of m by the constant c. Remark that when N = 2 (i.e. for binary messages), m ⊕ 1 is obtained from m by replacing every symbol 1 by 0 and 0 by 1. We have the following two observations:
• Ambiguity in the padding phase. The message m and its padded message pad L (m) have the same digest. That is, for any key k,
• The majority selection function is shift-invariant. Suppose that S is a list of N -ary symbols and S ⊕ c is a new list obtained from S by adding every symbol of S by a constant c. Then majority(S ⊕c) = majority(S)⊕c. The shifting attack. Now suppose that the adversary has a pair (m, t) where Tag k (m) = t and k is the actual secret key shared by the sender and the receiver. From the first observation, we have Tag k (pad L (m)) = t. For an arbitrary constant c ∈ Z N , let m = pad L (m) ⊕ c. Then, referred back to the tag generation algorithm, the matrix (m ij ) in the re-formatting phase of m is equal to (m ij ) ⊕ c. In the permutation phase, since the permutation π is dependent on the key, which is fixed, the matrix (q ij ) of m is equal to (q ij ) ⊕ c. Similarly, in the randomization phase, the matrix (z ij ) of m is equal to (z ij ) ⊕ c. In the majority selection phase, based on the second observation that the majority selection function is shift-invariant, the digest t of m is equal to t ⊕ c. Therefore, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1 allows us to have the following shifting attack. Suppose that an adversary just observes a single valid message pair (m, t = Tag k (m)). By choosing an arbitrary constant c ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N − 1} and calculating m = pad L (m) ⊕ c, t = t ⊕ c, the adversary has successfully form a new valid pair (m , t ) without any knowledge of any secret information. This is a strongest passive attack.
Example: Suppose that N = 2 and L = 3. We follow the tag generation algorithm of the GAC scheme to calculate the digest for m = 00000001111111. First, the length of m is 14, so we need to pad one zero to m and we have Pad 4 (m) = 000000011111110. Suppose the permutation π is "clockwise rotation of all outer entries by 
B. Multi-round mode and the corresponding attack
Ge, Arce and Crescenzo also proposed a multi-round mode, where the majority selection is performed several times. To find a tag for a message m, we first zero-pad it to a string m pad of length L × U i=1 R i , add some random values, and then permute it. After that we arrange the message into a matrix (called M U )of U i=1 R i rows and L columns. From the top to the bottom, we perform the majority selection to each group of R U rows. So each group of R U rows produces a new row and we have altogether
rows and L columns. Now in this new matrix, we group R U −1 rows together and do the majority selection. We obtain a matrix M U −2 of U −2 i=1 R i rows and L columns. Keep doing like this, eventually, we have a matrix M 1 of R 1 rows and L columns. A final majority selection gives us the digest t of length L.
We will show that the shifting attack also works in this case. Indeed, for any constant c ∈ Z N , let m = m pad ⊕ c and t = t ⊕ c. We claim that the digest for m is t .
The proof of this claim based on the fact that the majority function carries the shifting. Indeed, the corresponding matrix M U of m must be equal to M U ⊕ c. After the first majority selection, we have M U −1 = M U −1 ⊕ c. After the second majority selection, M U −2 = M U −2 ⊕ c. And thus, finally, we must have t = t ⊕ c.
IV. THE CORRECTED AMAC SCHEME
In this section, we propose three modifications to the GAC scheme. The second modification is the most important one.
• The first modification is in the padding phase. Previously, a message is zero padded only if its length is not a multiple of L (the digest length). Now, we require that every message must be zero-padded with its length value similar to the padding for the standard hash function SHA-1. That is, at the end of each message, a 1 followed by a number of 0s, followed by 64 binary digits representing the message length, altogether form a padded message of length a multiple of L. With this padding requirement, our scheme can accommodate any message of length up to 2 64 .
Example: Suppose N = 3 (ternary alphabet) and digest length L = 5, a message m = 011222 is padded as follows. The length of m is 6, which is 110 in binary presentation. So the padded message is: 01122 2 message 1000 0 0000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00110 64 symbols presenting the message length Note that the difference between our padding and SHA-1's padding is that in our padding all the 0s and 1s at the end are treated as symbols of the N -ary alphabet whereas in SHA-1 they are treated as binary bits.
• The second modification is in the randomization phase. What we need to do to defeat the shifting attack is to destroy the shape of the frequency diagram. Previously, before the majority selection phase, each entry q ij is added to a random number r ij as q ij ⊕ r ij = z ij . Now instead of using one random number r ij , what we propose is, to generate two random numbers r ij and a ij , and set a ij q ij ⊕ r ij = z ij .
• The third modification is in the majority selection phase. Previously in the GAC scheme, it is not very clear how the majority selection function 2 determines the output in the case that there are more than one symbols appear with the highest frequency. In [5] , it suggests that if a "tie" occurs then it breaks the tie by comparing the adjacent values. However, what would happen if, for instance, all the symbols appear with the same frequency. In this corrected scheme, we propose that if s 1 < s 2 < · · · < s i are i(≥ 2) symbols that appear with the highest frequency in the input list of the majority selection function then using the secret key k, we generate a random index number r in the range [1, i] . The output of the majority selection function is then set to be s r . With this modification, the majority selection function is deterministic.
We are now ready to describe the new corrected scheme. The tag generation algorithm consists of five phases: padding, re-formatting, permutation, randomization and majority selection as follows.
• Padding: append at the end of message m one symbol 1, a number of symbol 0s and 64 (binary) symbols representing the length of m. The number of symbol 0s is calculated so that the the length of the padded message is a multiple of L.
• Re-formatting: suppose the length of the padded message is R × L, arrange the padded message into a matrix (m ij ) of size R × L • Permutation: use the secret key k to generate a permutation π for the R × L matrix (so that an entry in the matrix is permuted to a new entry). Apply this permutation π to the matrix (m ij ) to obtain a new matrix (q ij ) • Randomization: use the secret key k to generate for each 1 ≤ i ≤ R and 1 ≤ j ≤ L two random numbers r ij , a ij ∈ Z N , a ij = 0, and set a ij q ij ⊕ r ij = z ij , we obtain a new matrix (z ij ) • Majority selection: for each column 1 ≤ j ≤ L, do the majority selection
The majority function is defined as follows. If there is exactly one symbol that appears with the highest frequency in the input list then the function outputs that symbol. If there are i(≥ 2) symbols that appear with the highest frequency, then order them as s 1 < s 2 < · · · < s i . Use the secret key k to generate a random index number r ∈ [1, i]. The function then outputs the symbol s r .
V. PROBABILITY OF MAJORITY CHANGE
In this section, we devise a new combinatorial approach to calculate explicitly the probability of majority change and use it in section VI to calculate the security parameters for our corrected scheme.
Definition 5: Consider a list of symbols of N -ary alphabet. Suppose that we will modify n symbols in this list. We define the probability of majority change, denoted by p N ( , n), to be the probability that the output of the majority function given the original list is different from that of the modified list. Similarly, if we modify up to n symbols, then the corresponding probability is denoted by p N ( , ≤ n).
We will find explicit formulae for p N ( , n) and p N ( , ≤ n). Let us start with the binary case N = 2. Theorem 2: For any n ≤ 2 , we have
Proof: We view the input list as a string of length . There are 2 possible strings. For each string, there are n possible ways to change n symbols. So altogether we have 2 n possibilities. Among these, we count how many cases that given the original string and the modified string as inputs, the two outputs of the majority selection function differs. For simplicity, we exclude cases where a tie occurs (i.e. the number of 1 is equal to the number of 0). Suppose the output of the majority function changes from 0 to 1 where the original string contains i ones and − i zeros, and there are u modifications from one to zero and n − u modifications from zero to one. There are i ways to choose a string containing i ones (and thus, − i zeros). There are i u ways to make u modifications from one to zero, and there are −i n−u ways to make n − u modifications from zero to one. So altogether we have 
So we have: . Therefore, the number of cases that the output of the majority function changes from 0 to 1 is
Similarly, there are the same number of cases that the output of the majority function changes from 1 to 0. So the probability of majority change is
Theorem 3: For any n ≤ 2 , we have
Proof: We view the input list as a string of length . There are 2 possible strings. For each string, there are j possible ways to change j symbols. We can modify j symbols where 0 ≤ j ≤ n. Thus, altogether we have 2 n j=0 j possibilities. Among these, we count how many cases that given the original string and the modified string as inputs, the two outputs of the majority selection function differs.
As in the proof of Theorem 2, for each 0 ≤ j ≤ n, if we modify j symbols, then the number of cases that we have the majority change is
Therefore, altogether the number of cases that that we have the majority change is
and the probability of majority change is
By combinatorial manipulation, we can show that
Theorem 4: Consider the following variables:
The collection of these variables is denoted by (f , u).
Proof: For the simplicity of the notation, only in this proof, we assume that the N -ary alphabet contains the symbols 1, 2, . . . , N . We view the input list of the majority function as a string of length . There are N possible strings. For each string, there are n possible ways to choose n symbols to change, each symbol can be changed to N − 1 possible values. Altogether we have N n (N − 1) n possibilities. Among these, we count how many cases that given the original string and the modified string as inputs, the two outputs of the majority selection function differs. Suppose the output of the majority function changes where
• for each i = 1, . . . , N , there are u i modifications from symbol i to other symbols, (thus,
• in these u i modifications, there are u i,j modifications from symbol i to symbol j, where j = i, (thus, j =i u i,j = u i ). The modified string contains f i = f i − u i + j =i u j,i symbols i. Thus, the condition for the majority function to change the output is that there exist i, j
There are Q j =i ui,j! ways to choose u i,j symbols among the u i selected symbols to change from i to j. Therefore, altogether the number of cases that the majority function changes the output is
and the probability of majority change p N ( , n) is equal to
By similar arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3, we can show that p N ( , ≤ n) can be calculated from p N ( , n) as follows.
Theorem 5: With the same notation as in Theorem 4, we have
Below are some numerical results for ternary alphabet N = 3: We can see that the two probabilities p N ( , n) and p N ( , ≤ n) are dependent on the quotient n . When n = ρ is fixed and n gets larger and larger, the two probabilities converse and we will denote the convergent values by p N (ρ) and p N (≤ ρ), respectively.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we show that if the distance function in the message space is the Hamming distance then the proposed scheme is not secure. The reason is that the probabilities of majority change p N ( , n) and p N ( , ≤ n) are dependent of the quotient n and these probabilities tend to zero if n tends to zero. Thus, if the Hamming distance is used then given a valid message-tag pair (m, t) where m is a long message, an adversary can modify m to m such that m is distinguishable from m and (m , t) is also valid pair. However, if the distance function in the message space is the Hamming error rate then we show that the proposed scheme is secure and we can calculate explicitly the security parameters for the scheme.
A. Distance in message space
We will show that if the Hamming distance is used in the message space then this is not a secure scheme because any adversary can use long messages to attack the scheme and success with high probability. The attack is as follows. Suppose the adversary has observed a pair (m, t) where t = Tag k (m) and m is a relatively long message, say |m| N = ν e out . We argue that by modifying e out symbols of m, we obtain m with Hamming(m, m ) = e out and the probability that Tag k (m ) = t is very high. Thus, the adversary can successfully forge a valid massage-tag pair (m , t). This is a valid attack to the scheme.
We now explain why Tag k (m ) = t happens with high probability. In the tag generation algorithm, random permutation makes the errors between m and m spread out uniformly. Thus, before the majority selection phase, we have the matrix (z ij ) with L columns and |m|N L rows. At each column, the expected number of errors is equal to eout L . Thus, with two inputs m and m , the probability that the outputs of the majority selection function, at each column, are different, is p N ( |m|N L , eout L ). As we study this probability in the previous section,
eout L ) tends to zero. Thus, the tag generation algorithm will likely output the same tag for both messages m and m .
The dependence of p N ( , n) on n suggests that we should use the Hamming error rate as the distance function on the message space.
B. Security analysis and examples
Let ErrorRate(m, m ) denote the N -ary Hamming error rate between two messages m and m , i.e. ErrorRate(m, m ) = Hamming(m, m )/|m| N if |m| N = |m | N and ErrorRate(m, m ) = ∞ if |m| N = |m | N . Suppose the message space M is (ErrorRate, e in , e out )-sensitive for some e in , e out ∈ (0, 1). Let the verification algorithm VF k (m, t) be: calculate t = Tag k (m) and return 1 if and only if Hamming(t, t ) ≤ e T . We show that the security parameters p correct and p secure can be explicitly calculated based on p N (≤ e in ) and p N (e out ) as follows.
Theorem 6: The corrected (ErrorRate, e in , e out )-approximate message authentication scheme is (p correct , p secure )-secure where
L−i , and
Proof: Suppose m is a message and t is the corresponding digest. Let m be another message such that ErrorRate(m, m ) ≤ e in and t is its digest. Let i = Hamming(t, t ). In order for (m , t) to pass the verification algorithm, we must have 0 ≤ i ≤ e T . For each 0 ≤ i ≤ e T , there are L i ways to choose the places that t and t differs. The two digests t and t have L components. The probability that t and t have different symbols at a component is p N (≤ e in ) and the probability that t and t have the same symbol at a component is 1 − p N (≤ e in ). Thus, the probability that t and t have exactly i different symbols in the i selected places is [p N (≤ e in )] i [1 − p N (≤ e in )] L−i . Altogether, the probability that (m , t) passes the verification algorithm is
the other probability is proved similarly. Example: Let N = 2 and digest length is L = 160 (similar to SHA-1). Suppose e in = .01 and e out = .05. That is if m and m have less than or equal to 1% errors then they are indistinguishable and if they have 5% or more errors then they are distinct. Suppose e T = 16. So the verification algorithm VF k (m, t) is: calculate t = Tag k (m) and return 1 if and only if Hamming(t, t ) ≤ 16. With p 2 (≤ e in ) = 0.064 and p 2 (e out ) = 0.148, the security parameters are p correct = 0.971966 and p secure = 0.950290. If we fix other parameters and let the digest length L vary then as it can be seen in Figure 1 , when L increases then p secure increases and p correct decreases.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we show an attack to an approximate message authentication scheme for N -ary alphabet recently proposed by Ge, Arce and Crescenzo. This also means that the scheme for binary alphabet [16] by Xie, Arce and Graveman is also broken. We show that in the GAC scheme, an adversary without any knowledge of secret information, by observing a single valid message-tag pair can generate N − 1 other valid message-tag pairs. We propose some modifications to the original design to enhance the security of the system. The corrected scheme is as efficient as the original scheme and its security parameters are explicitly calculated using a new combinatorial approach.
